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Abstract 
All decisions are practically made within a chainwise social setup named a 
decision-making chain (DMC). This paper considers some cases of an idea (a 
project proposal) propagating through an organizational DMC. Survival of a 
proposal through successive links of the DMC depends on the relative power of 
those links, in addition to proposal’s intrinsic value. Then it is not impossible to 
reject a good proposal or to fail to reject a bad proposal, either of which may 
generate undesired, though not detrimental, outcomes. We consider here a 
simple metric to assess quality of decision-making. The notion of quality here 
derives from “not declining (not accepting) a project that is of high (poor) intrinsic 
value”. As Fibonacci series establish the mathematical basis of our proposed 
metric, metric is simply named a Fibonacci metric. 
JEL Classification: A1, C00 and Z1. 
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1.Introduction 
There is no doubt that decision-making is one of the key problematic areas of social life. 
Regardless of its importance, impact on people's lives or even on countries' performance, there are 
practically infinite instances at the heart of which there is a decision-making problem. Indeed, society 
itself can be viewed as a trivial means of facilitating complex and interrelated decision making 
problems.  
There is vast literature devoted to analyze decision-making processes. Individual preferences and 
aggregation of them lie at the heart of the social choice theory. The economic literature, hence, deals 
with how individual preferences are translated to social (or aggregate) preferences. This is mostly 
done with specific reference to structure of individual preferences, voting systems (putting formally, 
social choice rules) and their nexus, which is termed as outcomes. It is important to highlight that 
these problems entail a set of individual preferences that yield an aggregate decision at the end of a 
one-shot vote, without loss of generality. 
On the other hand, most decision-making instances include a sequence of approvals or vetoes. In 
this scheme, regardless of the evaluation method(s), whether an initial idea (a project proposal, for 
instance) will be implemented eventually requires a full sequence of approvals. It is then intuitive 
that one veto is enough to decline the implementation of the initially proposed idea. There are 
usually multiple decision makers in any organization and they can be structured in different forms. 
Although flat (horizontal) structures can be observed especially in smaller organizations, in bigger 
ones like government, the decision makers are arranged within a given hierarchy, which is well 
addressed by the term bureaucracy. Leaving for a while the details, any bureaucratic system is meant 
to simplify complex decision making problems by casting it in terms of a decision making chain 
(DMC). A decision making chain may be visualized as a linear path in an organizational chart, which is 
drawn from bottom to top including the related nodes. It is again trivial that, relative impacts of 
successive links in a DMC are proportional to their designated (or a priori defined) powers. 
This paper elaborates the DMCs with specific reference to above-mentioned impact on decision-
making and proposes a fairness measure for numerical assessments of the decision-making quality. 
The notion of quality here derives from “not declining a proposal that is of high quality and/or value 
added” or “not accepting a proposal that is low quality and/or not value added”. For simplicity this 
notion will be referred to as the “quality criterion”. This naming implies that decline of a valuable 
project proposal or approval of an irrational project proposal shall ultimately yield a lower quality 
outcome, which is supposed not to increase overall welfare. In other words, accepting or declining is 
basically testing a hypothesis. In testing hypotheses, there can be statistical and systematic errors. 
Since systematic errors are caused by non-random fluctuations from an unknown source, the 
decision makers should concentrate on the statistical errors. The statistical errors are of two types: 
False rejection (Type I) and false acceptance (Type II). Although the Type I errors seem to be more 
significant, the opportunity cost of Type II errors must be taken into account as well. Hence false 
acceptance of a low quality proposal is as important as false rejection of a high quality one and 
statistical errors of both types should be minimized as possible. In that sense, for an organization of 
any scale, not only encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship/intrapreneurship, but also true 
allocation of the limited resources is vital. 
Normal workings of any DMC, if designed for human beings' well being, are expected to yield 
high-quality outcomes. In specific, innovative ideas are supposed to be accepted and there is a good 
probability that these ideas shall include Pareto improvements. But deviations do occur; i.e. culture, 
institutional inertia, etc. may well induce these deviations. Indeed, deviations themselves -as they 
are referred to in this study- are mainly deviations from an ideal scheme. Nevertheless, these 
deviations are at the same time establishing the norm in many cases. Namely, resistance to new 
ideas and strict obedience to status quo may already be the norms of a society. 
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Some examples (or hypothetical cases) may be useful for concretizing what this paper is actually 
about. Decision-making at the country level can be a good starting point. Suppose that a certain 
segment of the society demands a certain large-scale project (P) to be undertaken. Under normal 
circumstances, the political party representing the views of this social segment is expected to make a 
formal proposition in attempt to legislate P. Then, the proposition P follows an array of expert 
committees, commissions and chambers of the parliament before it is presented to the prime 
minister or the president for final approval. Moreover, the Supreme Court, for instance, or other 
higher courts may be further required to approve the legislated project. This can be accepted as a 
well-known DMC. Unless the country at hand is not democratic, such a chain can be trivially 
formulated. As a matter of fact, one should not undermine the fact that the proposition of the 
project P by a political party also requires a sequence of approvals. This time, the DMC is located in 
an intra-party manner. In other words, separate DMCs can form a DMC-at-large, which is by 
definition a DMC. 
Design projects can establish another good example. Most design projects are initiated by clients' 
demand. Following the needs analysis, a conceptual design framework or alternative frameworks are 
presented to superintendents for initial approval. Assuming that the initial proposal is approved, it 
should be approved again and again until the project is authorized. In such a case, the client has the 
strongest jurisdiction to finally approve or decline the proposal. Some other design proposals 
originate from incubators, as in the case of many R&D companies. However, the origin of the initial 
idea is not supposed to change the nature of the DMC. The requirement that “a full sequence of 
approvals is needed” remains intact. 
This paper aims to reach a measure of the extent to which a DMC might generate low-quality 
outcomes, i.e. it declines a favorable proposal or accepts an unfavorable one. By this angle, the study 
aims to propose a metric in order to evaluate the past decision making inefficiencies as well as latent 
inefficiencies inherent to decision-making chains. Our approach resorts to extensive use of a very 
well known mathematical construct, the Fibonacci series, while defining our measure. As the current 
approach does not entail an optimizing aspect, paper seems fairly eclectic. 
In the next section, we introduce the proposed metric. Section 3 elaborates possible applications 
of this metric and some further research directions.
1
 
2.Developing the Model 
2.1.The Decision Making Mechanism 
Suppose that there are n  links in a DMC, each of which is marked with jL  where nj ,...,2,1= . jL 's 
are located in the DMC in an increasing order of their importance (i.e. impact) in decision making. 
A decision instance starts with initiation of a new idea (equivalently a proposal) at a certain link of 
the DMC. This can arbitrarily be selected as 1L , namely the starting link of the DMC. So the starting 
link can be thought of as the person (or a unit within an organization) who has initiated the idea. 
We assume the following rule, for simplicity: For a proposal to propagate across the DMC, the 
initiator has to persuade the next link of the DMC, probably the nearest workmate or the nearest 
superior. If the idea is rejected by the second link then it is dismissed from the DMC. However, in the 
case that the second link gives credit to the initial idea, the second link now has the responsibility to 
defend it in later stages. Hence, the remaining steps are trivially replications of the first step of 
persuasion. That is, the second link tries to persuade the third, the third tries to persuade the fourth 
and so on. If the idea reaches 
n
L  and gets accepted there, then it is approved and the project is 
launched. 
                                               
1
 A brief overview of Fibonacci series is provided along with its applications in natural sciences and art in Appendix A. 
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2.2.The Assignment of Powers 
Upon the decision-making mechanism introduced in the previous subsection, now we are ready 
to add “power” to picture. This is where we resort to elements of a Fibonacci series. We take the 
recurrence relation defined in Appendix A, starting from the two non-zero elements which are both 
1. The values of the first n nonzero members of sequence are assigned to successive links of the 
DMC, which is of length n . We may denote these individual powers as: 
For n=1,     1)( =nE    (1) 
For n=2,     1)( =nE    (2) 
Then for n>2,    )2()1()( −+−= nEnEnE   (3) 
These values indicate the persuasion power (or potential impact on the final decision) of each link 
of the DMC. These assigned powers can be interpreted as the importance of each link within the 
DMC and this picture borrows largely from our everyday bureaucratic experiences: If an initial idea 
does not get a full array of approvals, it does not eventually get implemented. 
What we introduce further is the cumulative power of each link in the DMC. The cumulative 
power of the first link equals her individual power, by definition. The second link, once she approves 
the initial idea of the first link, gains the power assigned to the first link. Similarly, the third gains the 
power of the second, so and so forth, as long as the latter approves the proposal of the former. 
Indeed, the cumulative power series is nothing but another Fibonacci series: 
For n=1,      )()( nEnE c =   (4) 
Then for n ≥ 2,    )1()()( −+= nEnEnE c   (5) 
It is clear that individual power sequence of {1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, …} generates the cumulative power 
sequence of {1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, …} 
When 1L  has a project proposal, following the DMC defined earlier, she consults 2L . At this point, 
)1(cE is compared to )2(E . When 2L  accepts the proposal she consults 3L . At this point, )2(cE is 
compared to )3(E . General step is such that, jL , having accepted the proposal, consults 1+jL , where 
)( jE c is compared to )1( +jE . 
2.3.What Happens in Each Turn? 
Every time a lower rank link consults a higher rank link, an isolated decision instance is 
experienced. As to the structure and rules of this isolated instance, we are not prescriptive. The 
decision can be made against any technically plausible background. For instance, if the proposal 
involves a measure of return, the upper rank link may compare the projected return of project to 
appropriate benchmarks and may evaluate the associated risks to reach a conclusion. What she is 
assumed not to do is to arbitrarily reject or accept the proposal. In other words, the proposal will not 
be subject to the full discretion of the evaluating body. This is equivalent to saying that a project’s 
chance to being accepted (or rejected) is not altered by the relative powers of successive links. 
When we use the power assignments of the previous subsection as well as the resulting 
cumulative powers, immunity of the probability of a project being accepted (or rejected) is provided 
by the equality of )( jE c and )1( +jE . Satisfaction of )( jE c = )1( +jE does not necessarily mean that 
every proposal will be accepted (or rejected). Only thing that we know is nothing but the chance of a 
proposal (based on its intrinsic value) shall remain intact throughout the evaluation process that 
involves a sequence of comparisons. 
The case that )1( +jE > )( jE c represents discretion of the evaluating body, i.e. she might arbitrarily 
decline a proposal without any solid reference to its intrinsic value. The opposite extreme involves 
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)( jE c > )1( +jE and it corresponds to the case of a supervisor with practically no power. The 
probability of a proposal to be accepted is altered downwards (upwards) in the former (latter) case. 
As noted earlier in the introduction, each of these cases has its own associated costs. 
Note that existence of these cases does not necessarily mean that every single proposal will be 
arbitrarily accepted (or rejected). Rather, their chance of survival will be changed compared to the 
case of )( jE c = )1( +jE . The extents to which chances are altered are not explicitly formulated. 
Based on our treatment up to this point, the notion of fairness for a DMC is defined. Fairness is 
defined as the endurance of a proposal’s acceptance probability to evaluating links’ power 
assignments. Then, a DMC is the “least unfair of fair schemes” or “fairest of unfair schemes” if it has 
power assignments that derive from the Fibonacci series, introduced in subsection 2.2. We name a 
DMC with this power scheme as a Fibonacci DMC (FDMC). The deviations from FDMC and 
implications of these deviations are discussed in the next subsection. 
2.4.Examples 
As mentioned earlier, we formulate a decision making mechanism in fairly informal terms. In 
order to enhance our arguments, so, some examples might prove to be useful. These examples are 
presented in Table 1 and except the first one; they are established pedagogically without any specific 
references. 
In Table 1, case I represents the FDMC. Case II is intended to depict a highly progressive 
assignment of powers. In case III, we try to assess what happens in a DMC involving ‘equals’. In case 
IV, we introduce a break at a single link and show how an FDMC deviates from the ideal case once 
the break is there. Finally, case V depicts the limiting case of FDMC. 
 
Table 1. Examples 
i  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 1L  2L  3L  4L  5L  6L  7L  8L  
Case Assigned Powers
(a)
 
1 1 2 3 5 8 13 21 
I 
1 2 3 5 8 13 21 34 
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
II 
1 3 6 12 24 48 96 192 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
III 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
1 1 2 3 6
(b)
 9 15 24 
IV 
1 2 3 5 9 15 24 39 
 
1 
ϕ  
=1.618 
2ϕ  
=2.618 
3ϕ  
=4.236 
4ϕ  
=6.854 
5ϕ  
=11.090 
6ϕ  
=17.944 
7ϕ  
=29.034 
V ϕ (c) 
1.618
(c)
 
1+ϕ  
=2.618 
ϕ + 2ϕ  
=4.236 
2ϕ + 3ϕ  
=6.854 
3ϕ + 4ϕ  
=11.090 
4ϕ + 5ϕ  
=17.944 
5ϕ + 6ϕ  
=29.034 
6ϕ + 7ϕ  
=46.979 
 
Notes: (a) For each case, the upper and lower rows display the individual and cumulative power assignments, 
respectively. (b) Indicates the break in power sequence. (c) Indicates the exceptional treatment of the first link. 
 
Case I: First case is the aforementioned case of Fibonacci DMC. It displays the fairness property of 
subsection 2.3. Initiating a proposal at link 1, this scheme ensures that original probability of 
acceptance of this proposal not to be altered throughout the DMC. 
Case II: In the second case the power assignments increase progressively throughout the DMC. 
This case might correspond to an organization in which a high degree of strict authority is 
exercised. In this case, practically every proposal is destined to arbitrary assessments and 
downward alteration of acceptance probabilities. However, the workings of the DMC in reverse 
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direction have no complication. Real life case of a military command chain can be a trivial 
example. 
Case III: The third case is a degenerate one as every single link in the DMC has the exact same 
power. To the best of our imagination, it is hard to find a real life and large-scale organizational 
counterpart for this scheme. A power scheme involving complete equality can, at best, be valid 
for small offices or small task forces. On informal grounds, rumor networks of daily life can also 
be a workable example. In case III, acceptance probabilities are likely to be altered upward. 
Case IV: The power scheme of case IV is intended to see what happens when we allow for a single 
break in an FDMC. As seen in Table 1, 5L has a power 6)5(* =E instead of 5)5( =E . Apart from 
this small irregularity, the power assignments are done in line with equations (1)-(3). This case 
is worth to underline: Any proposal passing through 2L  to 4L might get stuck at 5L as 
)5(E > )4(cE . A real life example can be constructed by imagining a mid-level manager who has 
a power assignment disproportionate with her predecessors in the DMC. 
Cases II through IV exemplify the outcomes of the deviations from FDMC. While the likelihood of 
acceptance of a proposal is altered downward in cases II and IV, it is altered upward in case III. By 
construction, only case I yields fair outcomes, in the sense that a proposal will not be subject to 
discretion of any assessing unit. As the FDMC is established to represent the ideal case, its limiting 
case might provide a simpler presentation of power assignments. Case V serves this purpose. 
Case V: Up to this point, we have assumed that new proposals are initiated at 1L . Indeed, this 
simplifies the pedagogy a lot. However, it is possible for a new proposal to be initiated at any 
link jL  where 1>j . Then the relevant power assignments start no more from 1L . Owing to the 
construction of the FDMC, the decision making mechanism do not malfunction. 
If we start from a late segment of the FDMC, suppose 10L  (not shown in Table 1), the ratio 
)()1( jEjE + converges to a certain value as j  tends to infinity. We are familiar with this ratio 
(see Appendix A) as it is the well-known golden ratio (ϕ ), which reads out 1.6180339887… 
Based on the observation on the golden ratio, it is possible to reformulate the power 
assignments starting from 1L : Suppose we set 1)1( =E , ϕ=)2(E  and obtain the sequence of 
powers by means of equations (1)-(3). The resulting power scheme is demonstrated in Table 1 
as case V. Case V seems to be a valid limiting representation of case I, provided that we 
exceptionally set )1(cE toϕ . It is obvious that the DMC gets stuck at 2L  once the exception is 
not made. 
Case V, at the end, represents a simpler FDMC which possesses the fairness property of the 
FDMC of case I, by definition. More importantly, it has a simpler verbal expression: To obtain 
an FDMC, assign a power of unity to the first link, then assign the golden ratio to the second, 
square of the golden ratio to the third, and so on. In other words, the power assignment of 
your nearest superior should be golden ratio times your power assignment, no more or no less. 
In the remaining sections, the term FDMC will be used as equivalent to the DMC of case V. 
2.5.Quest for a Metric to Assess Deviations from FDMC 
Despite we have avoided a full-fledged mathematical treatment in this paper, the background 
purpose of this study is nothing but to obtain a good numerical measure of how good or bad a given 
DMC is with respect to the fairness criterion of subsection 2.3. To this end, suppose that we are given 
an arbitrary DMC with )](...,),2(),1([ nEEEE = . We compute first, for 1,...,2,1 −= nj : 
)()1()1( jEjEjR +=+     (6) 
ϕ−+=+∆ )1()1( jRj     (7) 
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))1(()1( +∆=+ jSgnjS     (8) 
Intuition behind these is straightforward: Equation (6) computes the ratios of successors’ powers 
to predecessors’ powers. Equation (7) is to compute the deviations of these ratios from the golden 
ratio. Finally, equation (8) is to obtain the signs of differences from equation (7). This paper advances 
no further in mathematical terms, yet we set the following principles for assessing a DMC’s power 
assignments: 
• If )1( +jS is zero for all j  then the DMC in question is an FDMC. 
• If there are nonzero values of )1( +jS then the DMC in question is not an FDMC and it 
might generate undesired outcomes in terms of our notion of fairness. 
 The fair portion of the DMC is only as long as the index j of the first 
nonzero )1( +jS value. 
• If the first nonzero )1( +jS value is +1, acceptance probability of a 
proposal at 1+j is altered downward; hence from this link onwards, 
fairness criterion is seriously violated. 
• If the first nonzero )1( +jS value is -1, acceptance probability of a 
proposal at 1+j is altered upward; hence the proposal does not 
necessarily get stuck, despite the loss of fairness. 
One may develop a sophisticated metric based on Euclidean distance and obtain a good summary 
measure workable for any given DMC. 
2.6.Some Criticisms 
There may be several criticisms of the model developed in the previous subsections. The below 
apology is intended to address some of them: 
• The decision making mechanism is too simple or oversimplified. 
• The notion of power is quite unclear. 
• Voting or similar choice mechanics are omitted by the mechanism. 
• Mathematical level is low, except the charm of the Fibonacci numbers and golden ratio. 
• Despite there are several mentions of probability of acceptance (rejection) and the like, 
there are no formal probabilistic assessment of what is actually going on in the model. 
• The model may be useful to understand some real life cases. It is not clear, yet, how to 
accomplish this, from where to find data, and so on. 
• The link between the presented model and the earlier positional power literature is 
vague. 
• The problem is interesting yet the current treatment is totally fruitless. 
All these rightful criticisms sheds light on our further research agenda as presented in the last 
section of the paper. 
3.Further Research: Proposed Metric at Work 
3.1.Theoretical Directions 
In order to obtain a concrete model with solid theoretical infrastructure, one can introduce first a 
formal statistical treatment of what is happening at each link. To this end, the intrinsic probability of 
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acceptance (or rejection) can be defined as a prior probability and the posterior might be defined as 
a probability conditional upon )()1( jEjE + . The extent to which the posterior differs from the prior 
can be a good measure of aforementioned “alteration” of chance of acceptance (or rejection). 
Obviously, there will be a long array of assumptions on the shape of probability functions. 
In order to further concretize the model, a concept of cost must be introduced to the model. 
Indeed, if there are no associated costs, the problem itself is degenerate. A minimization argument 
then is indispensable; i.e. a total cost function including costs of rejecting a good proposal or 
accepting a bad proposal can be minimized with respect to the sequence of ratios )()1( jEjE + . 
Whether the minimization confirms a Fibonacci-like assignment of powers is not that obvious.  
Then more complex forms of the decision making rule along the DMC can be taken into 
consideration. 
Endogenous prior probabilities can provide a more interesting direction of research. If a link (an 
individual or a unit) realizes the distortions on the chance that its proposal is accepted, in a repeated 
game fashion, it might consider tailoring the proposal so as to maximize the chance to survive 
through the DMC. Clearly such a treatment requires an explicit correspondence between the 
properties of a project and its chances of acceptance. 
If one thinks of a DMC where each link is a voting body, a nexus between the current model and 
social choice rules can be established. 
Leaving the further theoretical research directions aside, quest for better structured 
interpretations of the concepts of power, project evaluation and fairness within the current context 
establishes a good starting point for further research. In this regard, the power assignments of this 
paper should not necessarily be read as arbitrary attributions of ‘potential to impact final outcomes’. 
One is allowed to treat a power assignment as a perceived (or implied) potential to impact 
organizational decisions. In an imaginary organization, it is quite possible to have a de jure ideal 
distribution of power. Whereas, owing to cultural, technical and sometimes personal reasons, de 
facto distribution of power among links (of DMC) may be quite different from the de jure setup. In 
such a case, what really matters is the power of other links perceived by a certain link. Perceived 
power can also be named implied power. 
3.2.Practical Directions 
The current model can be a useful, yet ad hoc, template to empirically assess the real life 
organizations. One of the two trivial uses of the model is in comparing alternative DMCs. In that, 
based on the closeness of two DMCs to the FDMC, one can generate fairness scores. These scores, 
whenever computable, can be used to sort organizations. 
Second, the model can be used to measure organizational change in terms of our notion of 
fairness. For a given organization and for its given decision making mechanism, a current score can 
be computed. Then changes in the organization’s structure and/or in its decision rules can be 
assessed against the gains (or losses) in fairness score. 
With regard to the practical use of our model, there are some questions to study. The first is 
about the source of organizational data: Should/can one employ surveys to gather data (note that 
this is nothing but the ‘perceived power’ of the previous subsection) on power assignments of links? 
This seems to be a feasible alternative, yet survey outcomes can be quite biased by a number of 
social and/or psychological factors. If this turns out not to be a workable alternative, one may prefer 
revisiting the organizational records of project proposals in retrospect. That is, destinies of a long 
array of past proposals can be assessed in order to obtain the likelihood of acceptance (or rejection) 
at a certain link of DMC. This is equivalent to extracting a consolidated picture of odd ratios of 
acceptance based on historical data. By the very nature of many organizations, historical data on 
proposals might not exist, or might exist only for the accepted proposals. 
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The second question regards the intrinsic probability of acceptance of a proposal. This more 
complicated question requires some objective body to re-assess an organization’s past data, which is 
quite an expensive process. However, such an assessment is indispensable for measuring the 
alterations in acceptance (rejection) probabilities. 
Finally, a clear enough connection between the abstraction of the current model and actual 
organizational structure is necessary. Existence of feedback and/or internal audit mechanisms and 
the extent to which they are active may, indeed, alter the empirical conclusions. 
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Appendix A. Fibonacci Numbers: A Short Background 
Mathematics of Fibonacci Numbers 
The Fibonacci numbers are defined as a sequence of numbers
2
 in mathematics. The following 
simple recurrence relation defines the sequence: 
For n=0,    0)( =nF    (A1) 
For n=1,    1)( =nF    (A2) 
Then for n>1,   )2()1()( −+−= nFnFnF   (A3) 
That is, after the two starting (or initial) values, each subsequent number is the sum of the two 
preceding ones. The first few members of the sequence are 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 
233, 377,...
3
 
Like every sequence defined by linear recurrence, the Fibonacci numbers have a closed-form 
solution, which has become known as Binet's formula despite it was already known by Abraham de 
Moivre. The numbers in the sequence can be generated by: 
5)1()( nnnF ϕϕ −−=    (A4) 
where ϕ  is popularly known as the golden ratio.4 Indeed, ϕ  is the positive root of the equation: 
012 =−− xx     (A5) 
which is the generating polynomial (or characteristic equation) of the recursion. 
The golden ratio, ϕ , is the limit5 of the two consecutive Fibonacci numbers as the index of 
sequence tends to infinity. In formal terms: 
)()1(lim nFnF
n
+=
∞→ϕ    (A6) 
Fibonacci Numbers in Nature 
There are several places and different contexts on earth where we observe that Fibonacci 
numbers are embedded in natural phenomena. Among these we can count branching in trees, 
fruitlets of a pine tree, breeding of rabbits, spirals of shells and curve of waves. We can expand two 
of these examples for better comprehension: In the case of branching in trees, the first (main) branch 
yields a second one in the next year, then each of the two yield one branch, and so on. Similarly in 
the case of breeding of rabbits, a rabbit has a baby rabbit in the first year, then each have a kid in the 
next year, and so on. Other examples are quite similar to these two. 
In art, although the Fibonacci numbers themselves do not explicitly appear, the most refined 
product of Fibonacci numbers, namely the golden ratio appear in many places. A beautiful rectangle, 
for example, is defined as that having proportion of its sides closest to the golden ratio. In many 
Leonardo da Vinci paintings, the basic figure is enveloped within a golden rectangle in addition to the 
observation that several objects are fit into other golden rectangles, where, off course, the 
rectangles themselves are not visible on paintings. 
                                               
2
 Named after Leonardo of Pisa, known as Fibonacci, whose Liber Abaci published in 1202 introduced the sequence to 
Western European mathematics. 
3
 Each third number in the sequence is an even number. Note that, the sequence begins with F(0)=0 by modern convention. 
The Liber Abaci, on the other hand, began the sequence with F(1) = 1 omitting the initial 0. 
4
 Notice that 1-ϕ  = -1/ϕ . 
5
 This convergence does not depend on the starting values chosen, except F(0)=F(1)=0. 
